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ABSTRACT
Conventional steganalysis detects the presence of steganography within single ob-
jects. In the real-world, we may face a complex scenario that one or some of multiple
users called actors are guilty of using steganography, which is typically defined as the
Steganographer Identification Problem (SIP). One might use the conventional ste-
ganalysis algorithms to separate stego objects from cover objects and then identify
the guilty actors. However, the guilty actors may be lost due to a number of false
alarms. To deal with the SIP, most of the state-of-the-arts use unsupervised learning
based approaches. In their solutions, each actor holds multiple digital objects, from
which a set of feature vectors can be extracted. The well-defined distances between
these feature sets are determined to measure the similarity between the correspond-
ing actors. By applying clustering or outlier detection, the most suspicious actor(s)
will be judged as the steganographer(s). Though the SIP needs further study, the ex-
isting works have good ability to identify the steganographer(s) when non-adaptive
steganographic embedding was applied. In this chapter, we will present foundational
concepts and review advanced methodologies in SIP. This chapter is self-contained
and intended as a tutorial introducing the SIP in the context of media steganography.
Keywords: Steganographer identification, batch steganography, pooled
1 This invited chapter draft is intended as a tutorial introducing the steganographer identi-
fication problem in the context of media steganography so that a reader could easily master
the basics and key methodologies of SIP. Our focuses are the general technical frameworks,
ensemble methods, and feature reduction techniques. No matter what the final decision
of this chapter draft will be, if you find any descriptive or technical errors, please do not
hesitate to contact me. Errors will be corrected in the revised version. Thank you so much.
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2 CHAPTER 1 Steganographer Identification
Figure 1.1 Model of steganographic communication channel.
steganalysis, clustering, anomaly detection, unsupervised learning, social networks.
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Steganography [1] hides from untrusted parties the fact that any secret is be-
ing communicated. It can be realized by embedding the secret message into an
innocent object (e.g., digital image) called cover. The resultant object called
stego will be sent to the trusted receiver who can perfectly retrieve the secret
message from the stego according to a key. A most important requirement
for any secure steganographic system is that it should be impossible for an
eavesdropper to distinguish between ordinary objects and objects that con-
tain secret information. From the perspective of the opponent, steganalysis
reveals the presence of hidden messages. The objective of steganography and
steganalysis can be described as follows. As shown in Figure 1.1, Alice wants
to send message m into a randomly sampled genuine cover x. She utilizes a
key to drive the embedding procedure to generate the stego y, which is sent
through the insecure channel and inspected by Eve’s detection algorithm, the
steganalyzer. Eve has to gather evidence about the type of communication
from a single output of the steganalyzer and decide whether or not to cut the
communication channel. If Bob receives y, he extracts m with the key.
There are two common principles for designing steganographic systems [2].
One is model-preserving steganography, aiming to preserve the selected model
of the cover source during data embedding, e.g., the histogram. The other one
treats steganography as a rate-distortion optimization task. For a payload,
we hope to minimize the data embedding distortion. In other words, we want
to embed as many message bits as possible for a distortion. Current advanced
steganographic algorithms first assign costs of changing individual elements
based on their local neighborhood and then hide the payload using coding
techniques with (near) minimal total embedding cost [3].
Steganalysis has been greatly developed as well. As shown in Figure 1.2,
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1.1 Introduction 3
Figure 1.2 Steganalysis as a binary classification problem.
the contemporary approach to steganalysis involves three components. It ex-
tracts steganalytic features from objects; it supplies training sets of cover and
stego objects; and it runs a machine learning algorithm (e.g., SVM) on the
training data. This creates a decision function for novel objects, classifying
them as cover or stego. Since steganography generally modifies noise-like com-
ponents of the cover, advanced feature extractors aim to mine the statistical
difference in high-frequency areas for detection.
In traditional steganalysis, each cover object is treated in isolation, which
is implicit in the vast majority of the literature, e.g., they separate cover ob-
jects from stego objects, working on each object individually. However, such
a restriction is unrealistic: In practice, we may face a complex scenario that
multiple network actors send a set of media files while one or some of them are
using steganography. To make matters even more complicated, an actor who
is guilty of performing steganography will probably behave innocently some
of the time, mixing the stego objects with genuine covers [4]. Therefore, any
steganalyst will surely have to consider multiple actors, and each will trans-
mit multiple objects, which is referred to as the Steganographer Identification
Problem (SIP). One might use traditional steganalysis to find stegos and then
identify the guilty actors. However, the guilty actors may be lost due to a
number of false alarms. Because, most traditional steganalysis algorithms in-
volve a binary classification algorithm, which has to be trained on large sets
of covers and stegos. In practice, the cover source of the actors will not be
identical to that used for training by the steganalyst, so as well as being com-
putationally demanding the training itself becomes a possible source of error if
an innocent actor is falsely accused because of training model mismatch [5, 6].
It therefore requires us to design reliable detectors for the aforementioned
complex scenario. Fortunately, though the SIP needs further investment, there
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4 CHAPTER 1 Steganographer Identification
Figure 1.3 An example to identify the guilty actor by unsupervised learning.
are some effective works reported in the literature. Figure 1.3 shows an exam-
ple to identify the guilty actor from multiple actors by unsupervised learning.
Each actor holds multiple images, from which multiple feature sets can be
extracted. Each feature set can be regarded as a “point”. By using unsuper-
vised learning based method such as clustering, the most suspicious point, i.e.,
feature set D, can be found out. Accordingly, Kim will be judged as the guilty
actor. Following this line, in this chapter, we will introduce the foundational
concepts and detail the methodologies of SIP. We hope this chapter could help
readers to master both basic concepts and advanced technologies for SIP.
The structure of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we
present the primary concepts and techniques. Then, in Section 1.3, we show
two mainstream technical frameworks for SIP. In Section 1.4, we introduce the
ensemble and dimensionality reduction techniques for improving identification
performance. Finally, we conclude this chapter in Section 1.5.
1.2 PRIMARY CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES
1.2.1 JPEG COMPRESSION
JPEG is a common method of lossy compression for digital images. The degree
of compression can be adjusted, allowing a selectable tradeoff between storage
size and image quality. Unless mentioned, we will use JPEG images as the
covers for steganography throughout this chapter because JPEG image is one
of the most popular type of cover over social networks. We here briefly review
the JPEG compression procedure in JPEG images.
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1.2 Primary Concepts and Techniques 5
The JPEG compression algorithm is designed specifically for the human
eye. It exploits the biological properties of human sight: we are more sensitive
to the illuminocity of color, rather than the chromatric value of an image, and
we are not particularly sensitive to high-frequency content in images. The
encoding process of the JPEG compression algorithm has five main basic steps:
1. The representation of the colors in the image is converted from RGB to
YCBCR, having one luminance Y, and two chrominances CB and CR.
2. The resolution of the chroma data is reduced. This reflects the fact that
eyes are less sensitive to fine color details than to fine brightness details.
3. The image is split into blocks of 8× 8 pixels, and for each block, each of
the Y, CB, and CR data undergoes the discrete cosine transform (DCT).
4. The amplitudes of the frequency components are quantized. The quality
setting of the encoder affects to what extent the resolution of each frequency
component is reduced. The magnitudes of the high-frequency components
are stored with a lower accuracy than the low-frequency components.
5. The resulting data for all 8× 8 blocks is further compressed with a lossless
algorithm, a variant of Huffman encoding.
The decoding process reverses these steps, except the quantization because
it is irreversible. Y, CB, and CR can be determined as: Y = 0.299R + 0.587G + 0.114B,CB = 0.564(B−Y),
CR = 0.713(R−Y).
(1.1)
For a pixel-block sized 8× 8, the DCT can be described as:
F (u, v) =
1
4
C(u)C(v)
7∑
x=0
7∑
y=0
f(x, y)cos
(2x+ 1)upi
16
cos
(2y + 1)vpi
16
, (1.2)
f(x, y) =
1
4
7∑
u=0
7∑
v=0
C(u)C(v)F (u, v)cos
(2x+ 1)upi
16
cos
(2y + 1)vpi
16
, (1.3)
where C(z) = 1/
√
2 for z = 0; otherwise, C(z) = 1. Here, f(u, v) denotes the
value at position (u, v) to be transformed, and, F (u, v) is the DCT coefficient.
Once DCT is finished, JPEG moves on to quantization, in which the less
important DCT coefficients are wiped out. For quantization, we need a quanti-
zation table T ∈ Z8×8. After quantization, F (u, v) will be updated as bF (u,v)T (u,v) c.
1.2.2 JPEG STEGANALYSIS FEATURES
Each actor’s JPEG images are represented by low dimensional feature vectors.
We call them as JPEG steganalysis features. In this section, we review two
JPEG feature extractors since they will be used latter. However, it is always
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6 CHAPTER 1 Steganographer Identification
free for us to design other efficient feature extractors for JPEG steganalysis.
1.2.2.1 PEV-274 Features
T. Pevny´ and J. Fridrich [7] merged the DCT features and Markov features
to produce a 274-D feature vector called PEV-274 for JPEG steganalysis.
Let the luminance of a JPEG file be represented with a DCT coefficient ar-
ray di,j(k), i, j = 1, ..., 8, k = 1, ..., nB , where di,j(k) denotes the (i, j)-th quan-
tized DCT coefficient in the k-th block (there are nB blocks). Let H be the
histogram of all 64× nB luminance DCT coefficients, i.e., H = (HL, ...,HR),
where L = mini,j,kdi,j(k) and R = maxi,j,kdi,j(k). Let h
i,j = (hi,jL , ..., h
i,j
R ) be
a histogram of coefficients for DCT mode (i, j). Let the dual histograms with
8× 8 matrices be gdi,j =
∑nB
k=1 δ(d, di,j(k)), where i, j = 1, ..., 8, d = −5, ..., 5,
and δ(x, y) = 1 if x = y and 0 otherwise. The inter-block dependency among
DCT coefficients can be captured. First, we find the variation V =:∑8
i,j=1
∑|Ir|−1
k=1 |di,j(Ir(k))− di,j(Ir(k + 1))|
|Ir|+ |Ic| +∑8
i,j=1
∑|Ic|−1
k=1 |di,j(Ic(k))− di,j(Ic(k + 1))|
|Ir|+ |Ic| ,
where Ir and Ic denote the vectors of block indices 1, ..., nB while scanning the
image by rows and by columns, respectively. Then, two scalars calculated from
the decompressed JPEG image representing an integral measure of inter-block
dependency over all DCT modes over the whole image are collected:
Bα =
∑b(M−1)/8c
i=1
∑N
j=1 |c8i,j − c8i+1,j |α +
∑b(N−1)/8c
j=1
∑M
i=1 |ci,8j − ci,8j+1|α
Nb(M − 1)/8c+Mb(N − 1)/8c ,
where M and N are height and width, ci,j is the grayscale value of the decom-
pressed JPEG image, α = 1, 2. We can also collect calibrated co-occurrence
features, e.g., C0,0(J1)−C0,0(J2), where Cs,t =
∑8
i,j=1Ei,j and Ei,j equals:∑|Ir−1|
k=1 δ(s, di,j(Ir(k)))δ(t, di,j(Ir(k + 1)))
|Ir|+ |Ic| +∑|Ic|−1
k=1 δ(s, di,j(Ic(k)))δ(t, di,j(Ic(k + 1)))
|Ir|+ |Ic| .
J1 is the stego image, and J2 is its calibrated version. Calibration estimates
macroscopic properties of the cover from the stego. During calibration, J1 is
decompressed to the spatial domain, cropped by a few pixels in two directions,
and compressed again with the same quantization matrix as J1. The newly
obtained J2 has the most macroscopic features similar to the original cover.
This is because the cropped image is visually similar to the original image.
Moreover, the cropping operation brings the 8× 8 DCT grid “out of sync”
i
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1.2 Primary Concepts and Techniques 7
with the previous compression, which effectively suppresses the influence of
the previous JPEG compression and the embedding changes.
The above analysis allows us to construct 193-D DCT features. In detail,
we first collect 66-D histogram features, i.e.,
Hl(J1)−Hl(J2), l ∈ {−5,−4, ..., 5}, (1.4)
and for all (i, j) ∈ L = {(1, 2), (2, 1), (3, 1), (2, 2), (1, 3)},
hi,jl (J1)− hi,jl (J2), l ∈ {−5,−4, ..., 5}. (1.5)
For dual histograms gd, d ∈ {−5,−4, ..., 5}, we determine the difference of
the 9 lowest AC modes, i.e.,
gdi,j(J1)− gdi,j(J2), (1.6)
where (i, j) ∈ {(2, 1), (3, 1), (4, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2), (3, 2), (1, 3), (2, 3), (1, 4)}. It al-
lows us to collect 99-D DCT features. For the co-occurrence matrix, the central
elements in the range [−2, 2]× [−2, 2] are used, yielding to 25-D features
Cs,t(J1)−Cs,t(J2), (s, t) ∈ [−2, 2]× [−2, 2]. (1.7)
By further collecting V , B1, B2, we have 193-D DCT features. The Markov
feature set proposed in [8] models the differences between absolute values of
neighboring DCT coefficients as a Markov process. The calculation starts
by forming the matrix F (u, v) of absolute values of DCT coefficients in the
image. The DCT coefficients in F (u, v) are arranged in the same way as pixels
in the image by replacing each 8× 8 block of pixels with the corresponding
block of DCT coefficients Four difference arrays can be calculated along four
directions: horizontal, vertical, diagonal, and minor diagonal, i.e.,
Fh(u, v) = F (u, v)− F (u+ 1, v),
Fv(u, v) = F (u, v)− F (u, v + 1),
Fd(u, v) = F (u, v)− F (u+ 1, v + 1),
Fm(u, v) = F (u+ 1, v)− F (u, v + 1).
(1.8)
From these difference arrays, four transition probability matrices Mh, Mv,
Md, Mm are constructed as:
Mh(i, j) =
∑
u,v δ(Fh(u, v) = i, Fh(u+ 1, v) = j)∑
u,v δ(Fh(u, v) = i)
,
Mv(i, j) =
∑
u,v δ(Fv(u, v) = i, Fv(u, v + 1) = j)∑
u,v δ(Fv(u, v) = i)
,
Md(i, j) =
∑
u,v δ(Fd(u, v) = i, Fd(u+ 1, v + 1) = j)∑
u,v δ(Fd(u, v) = i)
,
Mm(i, j) =
∑
u,v δ(Fm(u+ 1, v) = i, Fm(u, v + 1) = j)∑
u,v δ(Fm(u, v) = i)
.
(1.9)
i
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8 CHAPTER 1 Steganographer Identification
If the matrices are taken directly as features, the dimensionality would be
too large. By using the central [−4, 4] portion of the matrices, the dimension
is then 4× 92 = 324. Obviously, the above Markov features can be calibrated,
i.e., M(c) = M(J1)−M(J2). The dimension of the calibrated Markov fea-
ture set, {M(c)h ,M(c)v ,M(c)d ,M(c)m }, remains the same as its original version.
PEV-274 uses the average M¯ = (M
(c)
h + M
(c)
v + M
(c)
d + M
(c)
m )/4, which has a
dimension of 81. Accordingly, for PEV-274, the dimension is 193 + 81 = 274.
1.2.2.2 LI-250 Features
Li et al. [9] proposed high-order joint features for SIP. The motivation is that,
most JPEG steganographic methods would change the correlation of neigh-
boring coefficients due to the modification of DCT coefficiants. Thus, Markov
transition probability will be affected with the data embedding operation.
However, Markov transition probabilities may be incapable of fully exploiting
the changes in DCT coefficients and may not completely capture the neighbor-
ing joint relation. Thus, Li et al. developed a 250-D features, by employing
joint density matrices, for pooled JPEG steganalysis. The high-order joint
features are driven from high-order joint density matrices of DCT coefficients,
which indicate the intra-block and inter-block dependencies of JPEG images.
The features include two parts: one part is generated from mean joint density
matrices of intra-block, while the other is derived from the mean joint density
matrices of inter-block. The details of extracting the features are as follows.
Denoting the quantized DCT coefficients in the blocks of JPEG image as
cm,n(u, v), where m ∈ [1,M ] and n ∈ [1, N ] are the indices of blocks, and u
and v indicate the positions of coefficients in each block. The intra-block joint
density matrices along horizontal, vertical, and diagonal directions, denoted
by F
(h)
ia (x, y, z), F
(v)
ia (x, y, z), F
(d)
ia (x, y, z), are calculated by:∑
m,n,u,v δ(|cm,n(u, v)| = x, |cm,n(u, v + 1)| = y, |cm,n(u, v + 2)| = z)
48MN
,
∑
m,n,u,v δ(|cm,n(u, v)| = x, |cm,n(u+ 1, v)| = y, |cm,n(u+ 2, v)| = z)
48MN
,
∑
m,n,u,v δ(|cm,n(u, v)| = x, |cm,n(u+ 1, v + 1)| = y, |cm,n(u+ 2, v + 2)| = z)
36MN
.
The intra-block joint features Fia(x, y, z) are then calculated by:
Fia(x, y, z) =
1
3
{F (h)ia (x, y, z) + F (v)ia (x, y, z) + F (d)ia (x, y, z)}, (1.10)
where x, y, z ∈ [0, 4]. Thus, the dimension of intra-block joint features is 125.
Similarly, the inter-block second-order joint density matrices along the three
directions, denoted by F
(h)
ir (x, y, z), F
(v)
ir (x, y, z), F
(d)
ir (x, y, z), can be calcu-
i
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1.2 Primary Concepts and Techniques 9
lated respectively by:∑
m,n,u,v δ(|cm,n(u, v)| = x, |cm,n+1(u, v)| = y, |cm,n+2(u, v)| = z)
64M(N − 2) ,∑
m,n,u,v δ(|cm,n(u, v)| = x, |cm+1,n(u, v)| = y, |cm+2,n(u, v)| = z)
64(M − 2)N ,∑
m,n,u,v δ(|cm,n(u, v)| = x, |cm+1,n+1(u, v)| = y, |cm+2,n+2(u, v)| = z)
64(M − 2)(N − 2) .
The inter-block joint features Fir(x, y, z) are calculated by
Fir(x, y, z) =
1
3
{F (h)ir (x, y, z) + F (v)ir (x, y, z) + F (d)ir (x, y, z)}, (1.11)
where x, y, z ∈ [0, 4]. Thus, the dimension of inter-block joint features is 125.
By combining the intra-block features and the inter-block features, we can get
250-D high-order joint features, which will be used for SIP later.
1.2.3 BATCH STEGANOGRAPHY AND POOLED
STEGANALYSIS
In SIP, each actor holds multiple digital objects. Normal actors take no action
to their own digital objects. While, for a guilty actor, i.e., the steganographer,
he distributes a secret payload into the objects held by himself. It involves
the concept of batch steganography [4], which can be described as follows:
given a total of n cover objects, the steganographer hides data in m ≤ n of
them and leaves the other covers alone. Obviously, to secure steganography,
how to best spread payload between multiple covers is a critical problem to
the steganographer. For a steganalysis expert, how to pool evidence from
multiple objects of suspicion is a key topic, which is called pooled steganalysis
[4]. The methods for SIP can be regarded as pooled steganalysis.
Recalling the goal of batch steganography: the steganographer wants to
spread a message of length L among images (I1, I2, ..., In) with secure capaci-
ties (c1, c2, ..., cn) using a steganographic embedding algorithm for individual
images. He needs to determine the message fragment lengths (l1, l2, ..., ln),
with L =
∑n
i=1 li, to be embedded into the images. There are four common
strategies reported in the literature [10]: max-greedy, max-random, linear
and even. In the max-greedy strategy, the steganographer embeds the mes-
sage into the fewest possible number of covers. Assuming that the images
are ordered by capacity c1 > c2 > ... > cn, it leads to the following message
lengths: li = ci,∀i ∈ [1,m− 1], lm = L−
∑m−1
i=1 li, and li = 0,∀i ∈ [m+ 1, n].
The max-random strategy is the same as max-greedy, except that the images
to be embedded are chosen in a random order. In the linear strategy, the
i
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10 CHAPTER 1 Steganographer Identification
message is distributed into all images proportionately to their capacity, i.e.,
li =
ciL∑n
j=1 cj
. For the even strategy, the secret message is distributed evenly,
i.e., li = L/n. The existing works [4, 11, 12] point that, for the steganogra-
pher, the optimal behaviour is likely to be extreme concentration of payload
into as few covers as possible, or the opposite in which payload is spread as
thinly as possible. However, these theoretical results could not be confirmed
without practical pooled steganalyzers to test against.
The aforementioned strategies require the steganographer to estimate the
capacities. Ker et al. [10] presented a method to estimating the maximum
message length for each available image for practical steganography. They
first query the implementation of an algorithm to provide an initial estimate
of the maximum message length. This is done either by embedding a very
short message into the given message, or asking for information about a given
image. Once having an initial estimate, they try to embed a randomly string
of this length. If the embedding fails, the estimate of the capacity is decreased
by ten bytes and the procedure is repeated. Otherwise, they deem the current
estimate of the capacity as the final. It is pointed that, the capacity for an
image is actually not easy to be well-defined in terms of security. One may
exploit steganalysis for estimating the secure capacity, rather than simply
estimating the maximum embeddable payload as the capacity.
1.2.4 AGGLOMERATIVE CLUSTERING
The hierarchical cluster analysis [13] seeks to build a hierarchy of clusters,
allowing us to partition a set of objects such that “similar” objects can be
clustered. As a type of hierarchical cluster analysis, agglomerative clustering
is such a “bottom-up” approach that each object starts in its own cluster,
and pairs of clusters are merged as one moves up the hierarchy. As shown in
Algorithm 1, the basic agglomerative clustering maintains an “active set” of
clusters (initially, all objects are belonging to the active set) and at each stage
the nearest two clusters are merged. When two clusters are merged, they are
removed from the active set and their union is added to the active set. It
iterates until there is only one cluster in the active set. The tree is formed by
keeping track of which clusters were merged. All that is needed is a method
to compute a distance between two clusters, for which there are a number of
options. We introduce several distance measures below.
Let us write d(x, y) for the distance between two objects x and y, and
D(X,Y ) for the distance between two clusters X and Y . The single linkage
uses the distance between the nearest points in the two clusters:
DSL = min
x∈X,y∈Y
d(x, y). (1.12)
i
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1.2 Primary Concepts and Techniques 11
Algorithm 1 Basic Agglomerative Clustering
1: Collect objects {xi}ni=1, and set distance measure D(·, ·).
2: A ← ∅ . Active set starts out empty.
3: for each i ∈ [1, n] do
4: A ← A∪ {{xi}} . Add each object as its own cluster.
5: end for
6: T ← A . Store the tree as a sequence of merges.
7: while |A| > 1 do
8: G∗1 ,G∗2 ← arg minG1,G2∈A
D(G1,G2) . Choose pair in A with best distance.
9: A ← A \ {G∗1} \ {G∗2} . Remove both from active set.
10: A ← A∪ {G∗1 ∪ G∗2} . Add union to active set.
11: T ← T ∪ {G∗1 ∪ G∗2} . Add union to tree.
12: end while
13: return Tree T
The complete linkage uses the furthest points:
DCL = max
x∈X,y∈Y
d(x, y). (1.13)
The single linkage can cause long chains of clusters, whereas complete
linkage prefers compact clusters; other agglomerative clustering algorithms
are intermediate, including centroid clustering
DCEN =
1
|X| · |Y |
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
d(x, y), (1.14)
and average linkage
DAL =
1
|X ∪ Y |2 − |X ∪ Y |
∑∑
u,v∈X∪Y,u6=v
d(u, v). (1.15)
The input to the basic agglomerative clustering is a distance matrix be-
tween objects. The output can be displayed in a dendrogram, a tree of the
successive cluster agglomerations using “height” to indicate the distance be-
tween clusters being merged.
1.2.5 LOCAL OUTLIER FACTOR
The local outlier factor (LOF) [14] is an outlier detection method by measuring
the local deviation of a sample point with respect to its neighbours, which
requires a distance measure d : X × X 7→ R. Assuming that, we have a set of
feature points C (vectors). We expect to estimate the degree of outlying of the
point p ∈ C. The LOF uses a parameter k ∈ N, with 1 < k < |C|, specifying
the number of nearest neighbors.
i
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In LOF, the k-distance of p, denoted by dk(p), is defined as a distance
between p and o ∈ C \ {p}, such that:
• for at least k points o′ ∈ C \ {p}, it holds d(p, o′) ≤ dk(p), and
• for at most k − 1 points o′ ∈ C \ {p}, it holds d(p, o′) < dk(p).
The k-neighborhood of p is defined as Nk(p) = {o ∈ C|d(p, o) ≤ dk(p)}.
Note that, the number of elements in the k-th neighborhood, i.e., |Nk(p)|,
can be greater than k. The reachability distance of p w.r.t. o is defined as
rk(p, o) = max{dk(o), d(p, o)}. The local reachability density of p is defined
as an inverse of the average reachability distance of p to all points o in its
k-neighborhood, i.e.,
LRDk(p) =
|Nk(p)|∑
o∈Nk(p) rk(p, o)
. (1.16)
The LOF method uses reachability distance to estimate density of the prob-
ability at point p. It also estimates the average density of the probability of all
points in the k-neighborhood, o ∈ Nk(p), and compares these quantities. The
level of outlying is therefore adaptive with respect to the closest neighborhood.
Thus, the LOF value of p is finally defined as:
LOFk(p) =
1
|Nk(p)|
∑
o∈Nk(p)
LRDk(o)
LRDk(p)
. (1.17)
The LOFk(p) captures degree to which p can be called an outlier. A high
value indicates that p is an outlier, since its reachability density, LRDk(p), is
smaller in comparison to the local reachability density of its neighbors.
1.2.6 MAXIMUM MEAN DISCREPANCY
In SIP, we need a measure of distance between two actors. Since each actor
has a set of feature vectors, we have to design a distance measure for two sets
of feature vectors. The maximum mean discrepancy (MMD) [15, 16, 17] has
been empirically shown to be quite effective for distance measurement. It can
be used for SIP. Given observations X = {xi}|X|i=1 and Y = {yi}|Y |i=1, which are
i.i.d. drawn from p(x) and q(y) defined on Rd, let F be a class of functions
f : Rd 7→ R, the MMD and its empirical estimate are:
MMD[F , p, q] = sup
f∈F
Ex∼p(x)f(x)− Ey∼q(y)f(y), (1.18)
MMD[F , X, Y ] = sup
f∈F
1
|X|
∑
x∈X
f(x)− 1|Y |
∑
y∈Y
f(y). (1.19)
Usually, F is selected as a unit ball in a universal RKHS H defined on
compact metric space Rd with kernel k(·, ·) and feature mapping φ(·). The
i
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Gaussian and Laplacian kernels are universal. It has been proven that,
MMD2[F , p, q] = ∥∥Ex∼p(x)φ(x)− Ey∼q(y)φ(y)∥∥2H . (1.20)
An unbiased estimate of MMD is:
MMD[F , X, Y ] =
 1
|X|2 − |X|
∑
i 6=j
h[i, j]
1/2 , (1.21)
where |X| = |Y | is assumed and
h[i, j] = k(xi,xj) + k(yi,yj)− k(xi,yj)− k(xj ,yi). (1.22)
For any two sets, we can use the unbiased estimate of MMD to measure
their distance. However, it is noted that, when a set has only one feature
vector, we cannot use MMD since its value always equals zero. In this case,
one may use Euclidean metric, i.e., d(x,y) = ||x− y||2, or other metrics. A
kernel function is required when to use MMD. There are choices for k. For
example, the linear kernel which is simply a scalar product
k(x,y) = x · y, (1.23)
and the Gaussian kernel is defined as
k(x,y) = exp(−γ||x− y||2), (1.24)
where γ is a parameter. Typically, γ is set to η2, where η is the median of
the L2-distance between features in the set of images being considered: this
means that the exponents are, on average, close to -1.
1.3 GENERAL FRAMEWORKS
In this section, we review two general frameworks used in SIP. It can be said
that, most of the present state-of-the-arts base on the two frameworks. Both
are proposed by Ker et al., which can be found in references [5, 6, 18].
1.3.1 CLUSTERING-BASED DETECTION
Suppose that, multiple actors each will transmit multiple objects, all of which
have been intercepted. Each actor may use multiple sources of objects. For
simplicity, we assume that, each actor has just one source of objects, but that
these sources could be different from each other. For each actor, we compute
the feature vectors from the objects held by this actor. We can think of this as
many clouds of points in the feature space, one cloud for each actor. A guilty
actor is one who using steganography in (some of) their transmitted objects.
We aim to identify guilty actors if their clouds of feature vectors stand out, in
i
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14 CHAPTER 1 Steganographer Identification
some way, from the normal actors’.
Applying steganalysis to each object individually might be valuable, but
it is likely that any guilty party could be lost in a crowd of false positives.
If we use a trained model for the objects to be tested, it will produce the
mismatching problem in practice. It is possible to perform clustering on the
individual objects, which may provide little information. It inspires us to
consider each actor’s objects as a whole to characterize their source. In this
way, we are to cluster the actors, hoping to separate an innocent majority
from a guilty minority. Here, clustering the actors is equivalent to clustering
the clouds mentioned above. Each cloud consists of a set of feature vectors.
Thus, we combine the hierarchical clustering with the MMD distance mea-
sure for SIP. The distances between actors are defined as the MMD distance
between the sets of feature vectors. If the features have been well-chosen so
that the difference between actors’ sources is less than the difference between
guilty and normal actors, the final agglomeration will be between two clusters,
the normal and the guilty. Thus, we can extract a list of suspected guilty ac-
tors from the cluster dendrogram. As well as depending on the features, the
accuracy of this method will also depend on the proportion of objects which
guilty actors embed in, and the amount they embed. Such detector assumes
that, the majority of actors is normal, and tries to identify guilty actors as an
outlier cluster.
Pre-processing the directly extracted features is necessary to guarantee the
accuracy of the detection method since the raw features have different scales.
Feature normalization is a good choice and other preprocessing methods may
be suitable as well such as principal component transformation. By normal-
ization, we mean linear scaling of features such that each column of the data
matrix X̂ has zero mean and unit variance. This means that
1
nl
nl∑
i=1
X̂ir = 0,∀r, (1.25)
and
1
nl
nl∑
i=1
X̂
2
ir = 1,∀r, (1.26)
where n is the number of actors, and l for the number of objects held by each
actor. The preprocessing enables the distance measure to be more meaningful
and not significantly affected by noisy components.
Mathematically, let A = {a1, a2, ..., an} and S(ai) = {I(i)1 , I(i)2 , ..., I(i)m } re-
spectively represent the actors and the objects held by actor ai. Based on the
aforementioned analysis, we describe the detailed steps for the (hierarchical)
clustering based framework as follows.
1. For each actor ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, with a well-designed feature extractor Efea,
i
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Figure 1.4 Examples for MDS representation and cluster dendrogram.
we extract the feature vectors from the objects in S(ai), which is denoted
by F (ai) = {f(i)1 , f(i)2 , ..., f(i)m }.
2. For each actor ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, normalizing F (ai) by the above method.
3. For any two different actors ai and aj , 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, determine the MMD
distance between normalized F (ai) and normalized F (aj).
4. Apply hierarchical clustering, and collect two clusters C1 and C2 at the final
stage of merging. The actors belonging to the cluster with a smaller size
are considered as the guilty actors.
Assuming that, we want to find k ≤ |C1|+ |C2| suspicious actors, and |C1| ≤
|C2|. If k ≤ |C1|, we randomly choose k actors from C1 as the guilty actors.
Otherwise, all actors in C1 and k − |C1| randomly-selected actors in C2 are
judged as guilty ones. For better understanding, we take Figure 1.4 for ex-
planation. In Figure 1.4, the above means MDS representation of actors, and
the below shows cluster dendrograms, from which the final two clusters are
encircled in the MDS plot. The left example implies C1 = {C} and C2 = {A,
B, D, E, F, G}. For the right example, we have C1 = {A, G} and C2 = {B,
C, D, E, F}. Suppose that, there has only one guilty actor. Then, for the
i
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Algorithm 2 LOF based detection method for SIP
Input: A = {a1, ..., an}, S(ai) = {I(i)1 , ..., I(i)m }, i ∈ [1, n].
Output: A ranking list r. . rk ∈ r reveals the k-th most suspicious actor.
1: Extract feature vectors for each actor
2: Preprocess feature vectors by normalization . Other methods also work.
3: Apply LOF to the n points (i.e., sets of normalized feature vectors)
4: Return a ranking list r based on the LOF values . r = (r1, r2, ..., rn).
left example, C will be judged as the suspicious actor. For the right example,
either A or G will be judged as the steganographer. If there are three guilty
actors, for the right example, {A, G} and an actor randomly chosen from C2
can be selected out as the guilty actors.
1.3.2 OUTLIER-BASED DETECTION
The advantage of the hierarchical clustering based framework is that, by pool-
ing objects from each actor together, the method improves the signal-to-noise
ratio compared with working on individual objects. This leads to better accu-
racy in the identification of guilty actor. The rationale for using a clustering
algorithm was that the group of guilty actors should form a distinct cluster,
that would be well separated from the normal actors. In reality, differences
in actors’ cover sources means that there is already variation in feature vec-
tors between difference actors. The steganographic embedding may exhibit
itself by a shift in the feature vectors in some direction(s). Consequently, the
guilty actors could be represented by outliers, and thus allows us to switch
our attention from clustering to outlier detection.
A lot of outlier detection methods can be found in the literature. The
local outlier factor (LOF) method would be a good choice as: (a) it requires
only the pairwise distances between points, (b) it is not tied to any particular
application domain, (c) it directly provides a measure of how much an outlier
each point is, and (d) it relies on single hyper-parameter. We use LOF for
detection here. However, we point out that, it is always free for us to apply
any effective outlier detection method for SIP.
We have introduced the concept of LOF in the previous section. Here,
we directly present the pseudo-code of using LOF for SIP, which is shown
in Algorithm 2. It is seen that, the steps are quite similar to that of the
hierarchical clustering based framework. The LOF method does not provide a
threshold, above which the element should be considered as an outlier. Such
method has an advantage. Namely, the LOF values do not depend on the
absolute values of distances, i.e., it is scale invariant. It is worth mentioning
that, by switching to outlier detection, we have overcome another shortcoming
of the clustering approach, which was the lack of any direct measure of “being
i
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Table 1.1 Confusion matrix for identifying one guilty actor: 0.25 bpnc, 25%.
Identified actor
Guilty actor A B C D E F G
A 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
B 0 100 0 0 0 0 0
C 0 0 100 0 0 0 0
D 0 1 5 94 0 0 0
E 0 9 7 0 84 0 0
F 0 9 14 0 0 77 0
G 0 16 7 0 0 0 77
an outlier”. If we know that we want to identify a single guilty, we can take
the one with the largest LOF value; if we want to identify a short list of the
k most suspicious actors, we can choose those with top-k LOF values.
1.3.3 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
We report experimental results in [5, 18] for performance analysis.
1.3.3.1 Clustering-based Detection
Suppose that, there are n actors, each of whom has m images, and we want to
identify a single guilty actor from them. The actors are simulated by images
taken from n different cameras, all are JPEG compressed with an identical
quality factor (QF). nsF5 [19] is used as the steganographic algorithm, which is
an improved version of F5 [20]. F5 is a steganographic algorithm that aims to
preserve the shape of the histogram of quantized DCT coefficients, making it
similar to that of the cover image. The message is embedded by changing the
absolute values of DCT coefficients toward zero. F5 is also the first algorithm
to use matrix embedding, which is a coding scheme that increases embedding
efficiency measured by the number of bits embedded per embedding change.
As its variant, nsF5 uses the same type of embedding changes as F5. To
avoid introducing more zeros, however, nsF5 uses wet paper codes [21, 22]
with improved efficiency.
Each image is represented by a 274-D feature vector called PEV-274, de-
signed for JPEG steganalysis and previously shown to be effective against
nsF5. However, it is admitted that, nsF5 is detectable by modern steganalysis
features. The hierarchical clustering technique with MMD distance between
actors is used. The expectation is that the final agglomeration should be be-
tween one guilty actor and a cluster of n− 1 normal actors. It is pointed that,
there is no training in the paradigm, and it does not assume any knowledge
of the actors’ cameras or the embedding algorithm.
i
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Table 1.2 Confusion matrix for identifying one guilty actor: 0.3 bpnc, 30%.
Identified actor
Guilty actor A B C D E F G
A 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
B 0 100 0 0 0 0 0
C 0 0 100 0 0 0 0
D 0 0 0 100 0 0 0
E 0 0 0 0 100 0 0
F 0 0 1 0 0 99 0
G 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
There are n = 7 actors sending JPEG images. Each actor converts the
RAW photos to JPEG QF=80 before transmitting them. Each actor uses
images of a constant size (the default resolution of the camera), but the image
size does vary from actor to actor. Tables 1.1 and 1.2 show the confusion ma-
trices for the identification of one guilty actor, with each experiment repeated
100 times per guilty actor. Each actor transmits m = 50 JPEG images: Table
1.1, the guilty actor embeds 0.25 bits per non-zero coefficient (bpnc) in 25% of
his images; Table 1.2, the guilty actor embeds 0.3 bpnc in 30% of his images.
The single linkage and linear MMD are used here. The identification of the
guilty party is performed by cutting the dendrogram at the final agglomera-
tion, which has been described previously. It can be observed that, the overall
accuracy are 90.3% and 99.9%, respectively. Performance falls of sharply for
smaller payloads since the guilty actors fade into the normal cluster and they
cannot be identified accurately.
Experiments are conducted with both linear and Gaussian MMD. Table
1.3 shows the experimental results due to different parameter settings. It
can be found that, the clustering based on linear MMD worked better than
that based on Gaussian MMD. Also, the choice of agglomeration algorithm
did not make a substantial difference. As expected, there is a dependency
on m: more evidence allows the detector to make more accurate detection
from smaller payloads. When m = 200, the linear MMD combined with any
linkage achieved perfectly accurate detection of the guilty parity with payloads
as small as 0.3 bpnc embedded in only 30% of the images.
1.3.3.2 Outlier-based Detection
Compared to clustering-based detection, outlier-based detection allows us to
consider up to thousands actors each transmitting up to hundreds images. In
[18], in each experiment, a randomly selected subset of 4000 actors and 200
images for each actor was used. The images were obtained from a social net-
work site, which automatically resized large images, to approximately 1Mpix,
i
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Table 1.3 Overall accuracy due to different parameter settings.
Guilty actors proportion of
stego images @ payload per image
MMD Cluster m 10% @ 30% @ 50% @ 70% @
kernel linkage 0.1 bpnc 0.3 bpnc 0.5 bpnc 0.7 bpnc
Linear Single 200 21.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Linear Single 100 18.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Linear Single 50 17.7% 99.9% 100.0% 100.0%
Linear Single 20 14.1% 96.7% 100.0% 100.0%
Linear Single 10 15.9% 86.4% 99.9% 100.0%
Linear Centroid 200 17.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Linear Centroid 100 16.6% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Linear Centroid 50 16.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Linear Centroid 20 13.4% 97.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Linear Centroid 10 15.4% 87.1% 99.9% 100.0%
Linear Average 200 17.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Linear Average 100 16.4% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Linear Average 50 15.7% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Linear Average 20 14.3% 97.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Linear Average 10 16.6% 87.1% 99.9% 100.0%
Linear Complete 200 15.4% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Linear Complete 100 14.4% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Linear Complete 50 13.9% 99.3% 100.0% 100.0%
Linear Complete 20 15.6% 94.9% 100.0% 100.0%
Linear Complete 10 16.6% 84.0% 99.9% 100.0%
Gaussian Centroid 200 14.0% 92.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Gaussian Centroid 100 13.7% 87.4% 100.0% 100.0%
Gaussian Centroid 50 12.6% 76.1% 100.0% 100.0%
Gaussian Centroid 20 12.9% 60.1% 99.7% 100.0%
Gaussian Centroid 10 15.3% 40.9% 98.4% 100.0%
and then JPEG compressed with QF = 85, at the time of crawling. Exactly
one guilty actor was simulated by nsF5. Four different embedding strategies,
i.e., max-greedy, max-random, linear and even, were used to insert Lp bits
to the images held by the guilty actor. L is the total number of non-zero
coefficients in the images. p is the number of bits per non-zero coefficient.
The PEV-274 features were extracted from the nm JPEG images, and then
normalized. The MMD distance between each pair of actors can be then de-
termined. Finally, the LOF detection method was applied to compute the
LOF score for each actor, which allowed us to identify the most suspicious
actor that will be judged as the guilty actor.
i
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(a) n = m = 100 (b) n = 400,m = 100
Figure 1.5 Detection performance due to different parameters.
For each combination of parameters, each experiment was repeated 500
times with a different selection of actors and guilty actor. The average rank of
the guilty actor was used as a benchmark to reflect how well the guilty actor
was identified. An average rank of one corresponds to perfect detection, i.e.,
the guilty actor is always ranked most suspicious. And, an average rank of
n+1
2 corresponds to random guessing. We do not expect a universal, unsuper-
vised detector to achieve perfect accuracy, but instead hope that, it provides
intelligence by ranking a truly guilty actor among the top 10% of all actors.
In addition, for the MMD distance, the centroid ‘kernel’ (a variant of linear
kernel, please refer to the Appendix of [18]) was used. And, for the LOF detec-
tion, a parameter k was set to 10. Figure 1.5 show the detection performance
due to different parameters. It can be observed that, the max-greedy strategy
is the most secure for the embedder: the average rank of the guilty actor is
higher in all payloads. The second most secure strategy is max-random. The
linear strategy is next and even is the most insecure. The reason that the
max-greedy/max-random strategy is more secure than linear/even has been
explained in detail in [10]. In brief, this effect is caused by whitening the
features in the pre-processing stage. Overall, with relatively large payloads,
the LOF method achieves efficient detection results.
1.4 ENSEMBLE AND DIMENSIONALITY REDUCTION
1.4.1 CLUSTERING ENSEMBLE
The clustering ensemble method combines the detection results from multiple
clustering sub-models. As shown in Figure 1.6, the clustering ensemble frame-
work is comprised of three parts: preprocessing, feature extraction, and clus-
tering ensemble. The preprocessing procedure requires us to analyze the char-
acteristics of the steganographic algorithm so that those sensitive components
i
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Figure 1.6 General framework for clustering ensemble.
concealing the steganographic traces can be separated out from the stego. The
preprocessing could be cropping, high-pass filtering, and other operations that
can improve the statistical discriminability between the steganographic noise
and the cover content. It can be said that, the goal of preprocessing is to
enlarge the “signal-to-noise” ratio.
After preprocessing, we extract steganalysis features from the preprocessed
objects, which reduces the preprocessed objects to vectors with a small dimen-
sion. We use T clustering sub-models {C1, C2, ..., CT } for clustering ensem-
ble. For each sub-model Ci, we can directly apply the hierarchical clustering
i
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method, by which we can collect suspicious actor(s) that will be judged as the
steganographer candidate(s). By merging the results from these sub-models,
the index value(s) indicating the most suspicious actor(s) that will be chosen
as the steganographer(s), can be determined.
For better understanding, we review Li et al.’s work [9], which is a related
work exploiting clustering ensemble for SIP. In their work, the images held by
actors are randomly cropped with smaller size to build actor subsets. Then,
the LI-250 features mentioned in the aforementioned section are extracted
from these actor subsets. After performing the agglomerative clustering in
the (normalized) feature space, a most suspicious actor can be separated from
the innocent ones. By repeating these steps, multiple decisions are made, and
the final guilty actor can be identified by majority voting. It is mentioned
that, in Li et al.’s work, the clustering operation is slightly different from
the above basic agglomerative clustering algorithm, and they use Euclidean
distance for two feature vectors. We detail the algorithm below.
Denote a set of n actors as {A1, A2, ..., An}, which include one guilty actor
and n− 1 normal (innocent) actors, each of whom transmits m JPEG images.
Clustering ensemble is used to identify the steganographer according to the
following steps.
1. Denote the image sets of n actors as {I1, I2, ..., In}. Each Ii (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
contains m JPEG images of size M ×N . Randomly crop each JPEG image
in Ii (1 ≤ i ≤ n) to size m′ × n′ (m′ < M,n′ < N). The cropped images
consist of n subsets I ′1, I
′
2, ..., I
′
n, where I
′
i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) includes m JPEG
images of size m′ × n′.
2. For each image subset I ′i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), extract the LI-250 features to form
feature sets Fi (1 ≤ i ≤ n), where Fi = (f (1)i , f (2)i , ..., f (m)i ) and each f (j)i
represents a 250-D feature vector. Notice that, each Fi is associated with
a second subscript j (1 ≤ j ≤ T ), i.e., Fi,j , to denote Fi used in the j-th
clustering sub-model since we have T sub-models.
3. Normalize the feature sets {F1, F2, ..., Fn} such that every column of fea-
ture matrix has zero mean and unit variance. Then, the distance between
different pairs of feature sets can be calculated with
D(Fi, Fj) =
1
m2
m∑
p=1
m∑
q=1
d(f
(p)
i , f
(q)
j ), i, j ∈ [1, n], (1.27)
where d(f
(p)
i , f
(q)
j ) represents the Euclidean distance between the two fea-
ture vectors.
4. Perform hierarchical clustering with the above distance measure. First,
two actors with the minimum distance are combined into a new cluster,
denoted by X , and the remaining actors are in a set denoted by Y. We
repeat to select an actor from Y and add the selected actor into X until
only one actor is left in Y. At each selection step, the actor Y ∈ Y who
i
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has the smallest distance to X is selected, where the distance between an
actor Y ∈ Y and a cluster X is defined as:
D(Y,X ) = 1|X |
∑
X∈X
D(Y,X). (1.28)
The last remaining actor in Y is considered a suspicious actor.
5. Repeat Steps 1-4 for T times. Each time, we identify a suspicious actor,
denoted by Ci, i = 1, 2, ..., T . By majority voting with T sub-models, the
actor who is identified as suspicious the most frequently is determined as
the final culprit. When there is a tie, randomly select one to break the tie.
The detection performance is evaluated by the overall identification accu-
racy rate, calculated as the ratio between the number of correctly detected
steganographic actors and the selected total number of steganographic actors.
In Li et al ’s method, the original images are cropped to images with a smaller
size. Li et al. point that, there is generally an optimal range for m′ (= n′),
namely, when the value of m′ is far away from the optimal range, the detection
performance will become worse. This interesting phenomenon is explained as:
When the size of the cropped images is too large, there is not much diver-
sity in the randomly cropped images, and as such, each sub-clustering tends
to generate same result. The benefit of clustering ensemble may disappear.
When the size of the cropped images is too small, the statistical features of
the images become unstable, leading to poor detection in each sub-clustering.
Experiments reported in [9] show that LI-250 outperforms pervious popular
JPEG steganalysis features PEV-274 [7], LIU-144 [23], DCTR-8000 [24], and
PHARM-12600 [25], which is explained as: on the one hand, comparing with
PEV-274 and LIU-144, LI-250 could well reveal the changes of cover elements
caused by the tested steganographic algorithms; on the other hand, although
DCTR-8000 and PHARM-12600 are conclusively more sensitive for supervised
binary classification, they have a high dimension and contain a number of weak
features, which may lead to worse performance for SIP [6, 26].
Usually, for single hierarchical clustering, better performance can be ob-
tained when the images are with large sizes [27]. However, good performance
with large image size in the single hierarchical clustering method does not im-
ply good performance of clustering ensemble using the same large image size
for Li et al.’s method. That is, when the size of cropped images is too large,
the diversity in the randomly cropped images is reduced, and thus multiple
clustering rounds are likely to generate the same result. The benefit of clus-
tering ensemble disappears. Therefore, it can be said that, the preprocessing
operation may have significant impact on the detection performance.
Intuitively, the higher T , the higher the overall accuracy, but the longer
the running time. In [9], the overall accuracy is tending towards stability
with an increasing T , and does not change seriously when T is larger than a
threshold. It is believed that, the cropped images have a lot of overlapped area
i
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when T increases, while the diversity will be reduced implying that multiple
sub-models may generate the same results.
It can be easily inferred that the clustering ensemble framework shown in
Figure 1.6 can be applied to other detection methods (e.g., LOF-based), by
making adjustments accordingly. We do not provide more discussion here.
1.4.2 DIMENSIONALITY REDUCTION
Different from clustering ensemble (which has good generalization in terms of
technical framework), dimensionality reduction focuses on the process of re-
ducing the number of random variables under consideration by obtaining a set
of principal variables. There are two important approaches for dimensionality
reduction: feature selection and feature projection.
1.4.2.1 Feature Selection
Feature selection attempts to select a feature subspace from the original full
feature space. Feature selection is often used in domains where there are many
features and comparatively few sample points. Feature selection simplifies
the model, and thus results in a shorter running time. It can also avoid
disasters due to the dimensional problem. For SIP, in mainstream works, the
distances in high dimensional space between features of actors are determined
to find the abnormal cluster or outlier corresponding to the steganographer.
However, in the high dimensional space, the distances between feature points
may become similar to each other, resulting in that, it is not easy to separate
the abnormal points from the normal ones. To this end, Wu [28] uses a simple
feature selection based ensemble algorithm for SIP. The method merges results
from multiple detection sub-models, each of which feature space is randomly
sampled from the raw full dimensional space. Unlike the basic framework, the
images held by a single actor are divided into multiple disjoint sets, resulting
in that, each actor is represented by multiple sets of feature vectors.
In detail, let A = {a1, a2, ..., an} and S(ai) = {I(i)1 , I(i)2 , ..., I(i)m } respectively
represent actors and the images held by actor ai. A detector computes the
preprocessed features for each ai, i.e., F (ai) = {f(i)1 , f(i)2 , ..., f(i)m }. All F (ai) (1 ≤
i ≤ n) are divided to disjoint sets with an identical size, i.e.,
P (ai) =
p⋃
j=1
Pj(ai), (1 ≤ i ≤ n), (1.29)
where m = p · q and Pj(ai) = {f(i)jq−q+1, f(i)jq−q+2, ..., f(i)jq }.
Accordingly, each ai can be represented by p set of feature vectors. We call
the p sets as “p points”. We can collect a total of p · n points, each of which
belongs to one of the n actors. It is naturally assumed that, distances between
an abnormal point and a normal point should be larger than that between two
i
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normal points. In other words, normal points are densely distributed while
abnormal ones are sparsely distributed. For any two points, we can use MMD
or other metrics to measure their distance. However, when a point has only
one feature vector, we cannot use MMD since its value always equals zero.
In this case, one may adopt the Euclidean distance or other suitable metrics.
Therefore, by anomaly detection (e.g., LOF detection), a ranking list for the
pn points is determined according to their anomaly scores.
We use pn triples {(ui, vi, wi)}pni=1 to denote the sorted information, where
u1 ≥ u2 ≥ ... ≥ upn represent the anomaly scores. vi denotes the correspond-
ing actor and wi is the point index, namely, we have Pwi(vi) ∈ P (vi). For
each actor ai, we can determine a fusion score below:
s(ai) =
pn∑
j=1
(pn+ 1− j) · δ(vj , ai)
p
, (1 ≤ i ≤ n), (1.30)
where δ(x, y) = 1 if x = y, otherwise δ(x, y) = 0. By sorting the fusion scores,
we can generate the final ranking list, where the actor with the largest score
will be the most suspicious.
In this way, we can construct a single anomaly detection system operated
on the full feature space. Obviously, we can build T sub-models {M1,M2,
..., MT }, whose feature dimensions are {d1, d2, ..., dT }. Each di (1 ≤ i ≤ T ),
is chosen from [H/2, H − 1], where H is the dimension of the raw full feature
space. It is seen that, each sub-model is exactly the same as the single anomaly
detection system, except that the used features are randomly sampled from
the full feature space. For eachMi, we can collect a ranking list, denoted by ri
= {ri,1, ..., ri,n}, and ri,j means the actor with the j-th largest anomaly score,
i.e., ri,1 is the most suspicious and ri,n is the least suspicious. Accordingly,
by further processing {r1, r2, ..., rT }, the final fusion score for ai can be:
sF(ai) =
T∑
j=1
n+ 1−∑nk=1[k · δ(rj,k, ai)]
T
. (1.31)
By sorting {sF(a1), ..., sF(an)}, the actor with the largest score will be the
most suspicious, and the smallest score corresponds to the least suspicious.
It is observed that the method has the ability to improve the performance,
which, however, is not significant and could be affected by parameter settings.
For performance optimization, one may design advanced feature selection al-
gorithms for choosing efficient feature components for detection.
1.4.2.2 Feature Projection
Feature projection should be distinguished from feature selection. While fea-
ture selection returns a subset of the original features by somehow way, feature
projection creates new features from functions of the original features. It is
excepted that, the projections of the original high dimensional features exhibit
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maximal information about the class label. Same as the feature selection, fea-
ture projection also reduces the complexity to help avoid over-fitting. For
feature projection, the feature transformation can be either linear or non-
linear. E.g., the linear principle components analysis (PCA) [29] performs a
linear mapping of the raw features to a lower-dimensional space such that the
variance of the features in the lower-dimensional representation is maximized.
Kernel PCA [30], as a non-linear extension of PCA, uses a kernel to enable
the originally linear operations of PCA to be performed in a RKHS.
Pevny´ and Ker [26] have provided profound study on feature projection
for SIP. They limit themselves to linear feature projections because it is be-
lieved that the steganalysis problem is essentially linear “in some sense”, e.g.,
experiments in [31] demonstrate that accurate estimators of payload size can
be created as linear functions of feature vectors. As pointed by [26], we can-
not expect that all stego objects move in the same direction, certainly not
when created with direrent stego algorithms, nor that cover objects begin
from nearby points if they arise from different sources. The boundary be-
tween cover and stego objects may be nonlinear. Accordingly, a good set of
condensed features will be a collection of different linear projections, which
between them capture the behaviour of different cover objects, sources, and
embedding algorithms.
Therefore, to achieve better performance, they exploit principal compo-
nent transformation (PCT), maximum covariance transformation, ordinary
least square regression, and calibrated least squares regression for feature pro-
jection. The PCT can be defined as an iterative algorithm, where in k-th
iteration one seeks a projection vector wk ∈ Rd best explaining the raw fea-
tures and being orthogonal to all projections {wi}k−1i=1 . It is formulated as:
wk = arg max
||w||=1
wTXTXw, (1.32)
subject to wTwi = 0,∀i ∈ [1, k − 1]. wk is k-th eigenvector of XTX, assuming
that the vectors are sorted such that the eigenvalue sequence is non-increasing.
A weakness of PCT is that, it does not take into account the objective func-
tion. Pevny´ and Ker define the object function as the presence of steganog-
raphy signalled by the steganographic change rate. It is to some extent re-
solved by finding a direction maximizing the covariance between the projected
data Xsw and the dependent variable Ys. Also, wk should be orthogonal
to {wi}k−1i=1 . It is called the Maximum CoVariance (MCV) transformation
method, which can be formulated as:
wk = arg max
||w||=1
YsTXsw, (1.33)
subject to wTwi = 0,∀i ∈ [1, k − 1]. The analytical solution is wk = YsTXsk,
where Xsk = X
s
k−1(I− wk−1wTk−1), and Xs1 = Xs.
Ordinary Least Square regression (OLS) finds a single direction w minimiz-
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ing the total square error between Xsw and Ys. Such optimization problem
can be formulated as:
w = arg min
w∈Rd
2YsTXsw − wTXsTXsw, (1.34)
the analytical solution of which is:
w = (XsTXs)−1XsTYs, (1.35)
which assumes that, XsTXs is regular and the inversion is numerically stable.
In practice, this is not always true, and steganalysis features may lead to a
nearly singular matrix. To alleviate this, a small diagonal matrix is added to
prevent non-singularity and increase the stability of the solution:
w = (XsTXs + λI)−1XsTYs. (1.36)
Good steganographic projections should be sensitive to embedding changes
yet insensitive to the object content, meaning that, the covariance between
the projection of stego features and their embedding change rate should be
high, while the variance of projection of cover features should be low. This
objective is not optimized in any of the above methods. To this end, Pevny´
and Ker propose a so-called calibrated least squares (CLS) regression method,
which finds the projections by iteratively solving:
w = arg min
w∈Rd
2YsTXsw − wTXcTXcw − λ||w||2, (1.37)
subject to wTwi = 0,∀i ∈ [1, k − 1]. And, the analytical solution is:
wk = (X
c
k
TXck + λI)
−1Xsk
TYs, (1.38)
where Xsk = X
s
k−1(I− wk−1wTk−1), Xs1 = Xs, and Xck = Xck−1(I− wk−1wTk−1),
Xc1 = X
c.
Instead of PEV-274, Pevny´ and Ker use CF-7850 [32] and outlier detection
[6] for experiments. Experimental results show that, in terms of identification
accuracy (i.e., the average rank of the only one guilty actor), the unsupervised
PCT method is worst. The MCV method is inferior to OLS in most situa-
tions, and CLS is significantly superior to the others. The explanation can be
described as follows: PCT focuses on the explanation of the variance in the
data, which is not exactly on par with our goal, as the variance in features can
be dominated by cover image content. MCV finds directions maximally corre-
lated with the explained variable (change rate). Although this is better than
PCT, the image content acting as noise is not suppressed. OLS maximizes the
covariance of a projection with the payload and minimizes the variance of the
projection. Since the covariance and variance of projections are measured on
the same data, it is not clear whether the variance comes from image content
or from embedding changes, whereas, CLS removes this ambiguity.
i
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1.5 CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH
In this chapter, we have reviewed the problem of steganographer identification,
in which we aim to identify a steganographer who sends many images (some
of them may be innocent) in social networks or public environment of many
other innocent users. The analyzer must deal with multiple users and multiple
images per user, and particularly the differences between cover sources, as well
as the differences between the covers and the stegos.
In despite of being posed for more than ten years, this problem was first
addressed by Ker and Pevny´ [5] in 2011. They introduced two general technical
frameworks for steganographer identification, i.e., clustering-based detection
and outlier-based detection. It can be said that, most of the advanced works
reported in the literature are based on them. Though, throughout this chapter,
we consider only one guilty actor (i.e., the steganographer), we can actually
identify a short list of k most suspicious actors.
It has been shown that, both ensemble and dimensionality reduction can
improve the identification performance. As a common operation used in ste-
ganalysis, ensemble merges results from multiple sub-models to make a final
decision. Dimensionality reduction, seeming to be more important, exploits
salient features and eliminates irrelevant feature fluctuations by representing
the discriminative information in a lower dimensional manifold [33].
The outlier-based analyzer is not compatible with rich features containing
lots of weak features, because the weak features contain lots of noise (caused
by cover content), resulting in inferior performance. Pevny´ and Ker [26] used
supervised feature reduction methods to improve performance, meaning that,
the complete outlier detector was no longer unsupervised. However, the fea-
tures showed a high level of robustness to varying the embedding algorithm,
meaning that the outlier detector retained its universal behaviour. Finding
the balance between supervision (to focus information) and universality (for
robustness) is an important challenge for pooled steganalysis for SIP, which
needs further investment.
Building upon advances in machine learning, Pevny´ and Nikolaev [34] at-
tempted to learn an optimal pooling function for pooled steganalysis. Al-
though experiments show that learned combining functions are superior to
the prior art, many interesting phenomenons were found, pointing to direc-
tions of further research, e.g., are there better strategies for the steganographer
to distribute the message into multiple objects, or the linear strategy is the
best he can do despite the steganalyzer knowing it? It is believed that, more
questions will arise as the study of SIP moves ahead [35].
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